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Abstract 
While theoretical models strongly suggest that short-sales are mainly driven by private 
information, recent empirical evidence of has been rather mixed. This paper contributes to the 
discussion by looking at various potential motives to sell short and compares these with regular 
buys and sales with regards to variation in the information contents and timing of short-sales. We 
find that short-sellers have different private information than regular buyers and sellers, which 
seems to have a longer life-time, being related to previous buying pressure. The information 
advantage of short-sellers seems originating from skilled analysis of publicly available data rather 
than corporate insider information. Short-sales provide an important stabilizing role by providing 
liquidity in periods of uninformed buying pressure. Overall, we find that short-sales are driven by 
multiple trade motives, which sets short-sellers apart from regular buyers and sellers. 
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1 Introduction and Motivation 
Throughout the financial economics literature, short-sellers are associated with market 
participants who keep prices in line with fundamentals (see, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978)).1 In 
particular, they move down prices that previous buying pressure has moved above fundamental 
value. This characterization rests upon the understanding that investors who sell short face the 
same environment and transaction costs than buyers. In reality, however, short-sales are more 
difficult to implement than regular buy and sell transactions due to additional costs and 
regulatory difficulties (see D’Avolio (2002)).2 This asymmetry in costs between short and long 
transactions motivates the argument that short-sales should carry more information than long 
transactions (Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)) and is reflected in the different information 
characteristics of short sales as compared to long transactions, as we find in our empirical 
analysis. At the same time, the more difficult it is to sell short, the less efficient the price process 
should be, which we also find in our empirical results. We therefore investigate whether short-
selling restrictions affect price efficiency. 
While short-sellers therefore seem to improve the flow of price-relevant information into 
prices, it is less clear whether short-sellers have better access to private insider information, than 
public investors. In that case, short-selling activity would be a negative contribution to financial 
markets as it imposes adverse selection costs on financial markets. Alternatively, if short-sellers 
merely express a view about fundamental values, there remains a chance that they are wrong, in 
which case they would impose no adverse selection costs to their counter parties. By comparing 
                                                 
1 The SEC defines a short-sale as “any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is 
consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller” (SEC (1999)). 
2 The so-called “tick test” laid out in Rule 10a-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that a stock can 
only be sold short “at a price above the immediately preceding reported price or at the last sale price if it is higher 
than the last different reported price” (SEC (2006)). Transactions that are always exempt from these short-selling 
restrictions are typically trades by market makers (SEC (2003)). 
and contrasting short-sales with regular buy and sale transactions, this study helps putting short-
sellers into perspective relative to the investor community who derive their private information 
from either insider information or from skilled analysis of public data. 
Short-sellers theoretically have two opposing effects on financial markets. On the one 
hand, they are considered to improve informational efficiency. On the other hand, they may 
impose adverse selection costs and consume liquidity, depending on their private information 
sets.3 Diether, Lee and Werner (2005) find evidence for contrarian trading behavior of short-
sellers. For contrarian trading to be profitable, however, short-sellers must be able to differentiate 
between random price fluctuations and changes in fundamental value. Taking short positions in 
the former situation would lead to profits while losses would accrue in the latter situation. This 
implies that contrarian short-sales are likely to be implemented by informed value-traders who 
exploit private information about fundamental values and the stock-market environment while 
providing liquidity to the financial markets. The third main research focus of this paper therefore 
is the effect of short-sales on financial market quality. 
This paper uses the recently available intra-day transaction-level short-sale data. In 
January 2005, a large set of U.S. stocks experienced a provisional suspension of short-selling 
restrictions while intra-day data of short-sales as part of Reg SHO4, allowing the investigation of 
the information content of short-sales, the impact of short-sales on market quality, and the 
interaction of the market environment and short-selling activity. Looking at short-sales on a tick-
by-tick basis is not entirely unique to this study. However, most intra-day studies of short-sales 
                                                 
3 Informed investors are general considered to consume liquidity, as the private information they exploit loses its 
value as soon as it is known to the public (Harris (2003, p. 226)). However, traders with private information derived 
from the analysis of firm-level data, referred to as value traders, also supply liquidity if uninformed traders push 
prices away from fundamentals (Harris (2003, p. 339)). 
4 As of January 3, 2005, Regulation SHO has been introduced to “exclude designated securities from the operation of 
the tick test of Rule 10a-1 (see footnote 2) and any short-sale price test rule of any exchange or national securities 
association for a designated period of time” (SEC (2005)) to “study the impact of relaxing the price tests” (SEC 
(2006)). Short-selling restrictions are suspended for around 1,000 pilot stocks selected from the Wilshire 3,000 index 
(SEC (2004)). In addition, short-sales are now masked, i.e., indiscernible from regular sales, which closer 
corresponds to the trading environment in theoretical models of short-sales. The list of these so-called “pilot” stocks 
can be downloaded from http://www.nyse.com/regshopilot. 
either have a relatively small sample that limits the scope of cross-sectional comparison, or rely 
on data from non-U.S. markets, with market features not comparable to most empirical studies.5 
The results of this paper add to the understanding of market quality and are potentially 
interesting to regulators and other market participants as short-sellers, while being apparently 
informed, seem to improve price efficiency and financial market liquidity. In addition, as this 
paper looks at potential sources of private information of short-sellers and thereby addresses 
academic discussions around the origins and nature of short sellers’ private information. In 
addition, to our knowledge, comparing the microstructure characteristics and informativeness of 
short-sales with regular transactions is new to this study and likely helps to improve the 
interpretability, academic relevance, and robustness of our results. 
The empirical results show that short-sales appear to be an important source of liquidity, 
especially during times of short-term buying pressure. Short-sellers seem to be able to distinguish 
informed from uninformed buying pressure and to mostly provide liquidity to the latter. 
Therefore, short-sales seem help aligning prices with fundamentals and appear providing short-
term liquidity. Compared to regular buyers and sellers, short-sellers information set has a longer 
life-time, is more firm-specific and increases with illiquidity of the stock of the firm. 
The average informed short-seller seems to be a skilled information analyst of the trading 
environment and the current economic situation. Short-selling restrictions appear to reduce price 
efficiency, implying that short sales are an important component of efficient financial markets. 
Also, short-sales done outside the NYSE are less likely to carry information and seem to be 
driven by hedging motives and inventory management. The remainder of this paper is structured 
as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the extant literature, and Section 3 develops the main 
                                                 
5 Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998), for instance, look at intra-day reactions of 150 stocks at the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX). Unlike the NYSE, the ASX is a limit order market that immediately discloses the execution 
of a short-sale. These features likely affect price discovery and market reaction to short-sales. Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang (2006) use only part of the orderflow (NYSE SuperDOT orders instead of all transactions), while Diether, 
Lee, and Werner (2006) use only six months of data. 
hypotheses this paper intends to address. Section 4 describes the data set, Section 5 the results, 
while Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
Short-selling and buying transactions are necessary in theory to make prices reflect the consensus 
view of economic prospects. Short-selling restrictions, however, may lead to upwardly biased 
prices (Harrison and Kreps (1978); Miller (1977)) and a negative return drift (Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987)) and thus make short-selling strategies appear more profitable on paper than 
reality admits (Géczy, Musto, and Reed (2002); Jones and Lamont (2002); Miller (1977)). Short-
sales may even be necessary to offset generally positively biased analyst forecast and to impound 
private information into prices (Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2006); Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, 
and Balachandran (2002); Pownall and Simko (2005)). Regulators typically restrict short-selling 
activity, however, to limit their perceived destabilizing effect on financial markets.6 Thus, while 
theoretically necessary to make prices efficient, short-sales are restricted in practice. 
Regulatory restrictions and high cost of short-selling7 make researchers conclude that 
short-sales contain price-relevant negative information (Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)), which 
Aitken, et al. (1998) empirically confirm when looking at the price reaction to the publication of 
short sales. Short-selling restrictions may therefore only be relevant when mispricing already 
exists (Ofek, et al. (2004)). In practice, however, short-selling activity may actually be dominated 
by uninformed trades (Daske, Richardson, and Tuna (2005)) due to tax-related trading, hedging 
options traders, dividend capture strategies (Senchack and Starks (1993)), convertible and index 
arbitrage (Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990)), and merger arbitrage (Reed (2003)). As a result, some 
empirical studies find no or only weak evidence for short-sales to contain private information 
                                                 
6 See Finnerty (2005) and Shkilko (2007) for discussions of “manipulative” and “predatory” short-selling. 
7 See D'Avolio (2002) for a detailed description of the stock lending market. 
(Brent, et al. (1990); Daske, et al. (2005); Richardson (2003)).8 Other empirical studies conclude, 
however, that short-sales contain private information about future returns.9 Shorting demand, for 
instance, is identified as a driver of negative returns during periods with weak public news flow 
(Cohen, et al. (2006)). Short-sales therefore seem to be based on a multitude of trade motives, 
which may or may not exploit private information. 
If short-sellers are informed, the next question one may ask is what kind of information 
they exploit. Some empirical studies suggest that informed short sellers derive their private 
information from financial data (Dechow, et al. (2001)), which   cannot confirm using accrual 
data. As financial statements are low frequency data, this suggests that informed short-sellers 
may use information that is updated more frequently. The contrarian trading behavior of short 
sellers makes past returns a likely source of private information (see also Desai et al. (2002)). 
Finally, as corporate insiders are particularly well informed investors (see, e.g., Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001)), it is likely that informed short-sellers also exploit insider information (Diether, et al. 
(2005, 2006)). The relationship between short-selling activity and future stock returns is stronger 
if there are no exchange-traded stock-options (Christophe et al. (2004)), if institutional ownership 
is larger (D'Avolio (2002)), and if analyst coverage of the stock is low (Pownall and Simko 
(2005)). This evidence suggests that short-sellers possess private information that other 
sophisticated investors, such as institutional traders, also exploit. 
The various ways to capture the activity and information contents of short-sales may be 
the cause that some studies find while other studies fail to find evidence for short-sales to be 
                                                 
8 Most of these studies look at the combination of short-selling activity and subsequent returns around information 
events. This assumes that short-sellers know in advance not only the content but also the timing of the surprise, 
which is typically available only to corporate insiders. Attributing these two pieces of private information to all 
short-sellers therefore is a strong an assumption as Francis, et al. (2005) point out. This narrow focus of the research 
design may be among the reasons that so few studies find evidence for private information to be used by short-sellers 
as this empirical set-up only tests the use of insider information by short-sellers. 
9 Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), Desai, et al. (2002), Géczy, et al. (2002), Jones and Lamont (2002), and Ofek, 
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) find a significant relationship between rebate rates, the interest paid for borrowing 
stocks, and subsequent monthly returns.  Boehmer, et al. (2006), Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001), 
Diether, et al. (2005), Francis, Venkatachalam, and Zhang (2005), Senchack and Starks (1993) confirm the 
relationship of short-selling activity and information contents of trades over shorter horizons. 
informed. Widely used measures are short interest, the level of borrowed stock, and the rebate 
rate, the “interest rate” paid on the borrowed.10 The negative relationship between stock options 
and these measures of short-selling activity is commonly attributed to the existence of informed 
traders who prefer using the options market (Christophe, et al. (2004)). Alternatively, this 
relationship may also be due to uninformed short-selling from options traders. As rebate rates 
also reflect supply conditions the stock lending market (Cohen, et al. (2006)) it appears that these 
measures are noisy in capturing the activity and information content of short-sales. 
Unlike most previous studies, we directly measure the information content and the trading 
activity of short-sales. This allows looking at the different motivations to sell short, the impact on 
market quality of the individual trade motivation, and the likely information set used by informed 
short-sellers. This paper therefore adds to the existing literature by studying trade motivations 
that are behind observed short-sales, the information content of short-sales and its potential 
sources and the impact of short-sales on market quality. 
3 Testable Hypotheses 
As short-sales can be informed or uninformed, the first research question is whether short-sales 
carry private information and if so, whether they use public or private information to generate 
their information advantage. The distribution of profits of short-sales, for instance, should be 
symmetrically distributed around zero if short-sales are completely uninformed; if short-sales 
carry private information one would expect more mass over the positive orthant, however. 
Looking at the distributional properties of short-sales relative to regular transactions allows 
                                                 
10 Monthly short interest is used by Asquith, et al. (2005), Brent, et al. (1990), Dechow, et al. (2001), Desai, et al. 
(2002), Francis, et al. (2005), Pownall and Simko (2005), Richardson (2003), and Senchack and Starks (1993). 
Weekly short interest is used by Cohen, et al. (2006) while Géczy, et al. (2002) use daily short interest. The rebate 
rate is used by Cohen, et al. (2006), D'Avolio (2002), Géczy, et al. (2002), Jones and Lamont (2002), Ofek, et al. 
(2004), and Reed (2003). Amongst the rare cases where short-selling activity is measured on a high-frequency basis 
are Aitken, et al. (1998), Boehmer, et al. (2006), Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), Daske, et al. (2005), and 
Diether, et al. (2005, 2006). 
getting a first impression of whether informed short-sellers are likely to use the same set of 
private information than informed traders that use regular buy and sale transactions. 
The second research question investigates the public source of private information further 
to identify whether they use market-wide or stock-specific information. Short-sellers with private 
information should be more active around price-relevant information events, such as earnings 
announcements. If short-sellers have insider information, they should know the timing, the 
direction, and the size of the surprise component of public announcements and anticipate the 
price reaction to the public announcement accordingly. An informed trader does not necessarily 
need to have insider information, however. Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) model a trader who 
receives only public information but is particularly fast and skilled in correctly interpreting these 
data in terms of likely future price moves. Therefore, short-sellers who on average do not take 
positions before price-relevant news announcements but rather react quickly to the publication of 
important information are likely to be – on average – skilled information analysts. 
The next question is whether short-sellers exploit public data that refer to only a single 
stock, whether they use public data that apply to many stocks at once, or whether they rely on a 
mixture of both.11 Comparing short-sales with regular buys and sales can thereby help putting the 
information structure of short-sales into perspective. If short-sellers possess more value-relevant 
firm-specific information, the activity and information contents of short-sales should be less 
strongly related to market-wide movements than regular buys and sales. The relationship between 
the information contents of short-sales and firm-level characteristics, market conditions, and 
trading characteristics further allows characterizing the information environment of short-sales. 
The third research question is about whether short-sales are a positive or negative 
contribution to the financial markets by affecting price efficiency and financial market liquidity. 
                                                 
11 Private information about systematic return factors that apply to many stocks at once feature in the theoretical 
models by, for instance, Admati (1984), Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2005), and Subrahmanyam (1991). 
If short-sellers actively take positions based on their private information, e.g., derived from 
insider information, they should consume liquidity (Harris (2003, p. 226)). Short-sellers supply 
liquidity, however, if they rather react to changes in the trading activity of uninformed 
momentum traders. In addition, short-selling activity may be destabilizing to financial markets if 
it is based on insider information and therefore the public investor rightly associates short-selling 
activity with adverse selection potentially resulting in large drops in liquidity and price levels. 
Alternatively, if short-sellers merely express a view, potentially one that is based on the analysis 
of public information, adverse selection costs associated with short-sales may be less severe, as 
short-sellers merely make an, albeit educated, guess regarding fundamental values, which 
includes the possibility that they could be wrong and thereby impose no adverse selection costs to 
their counter party. We therefore test whether short-sellers supply or demand liquidity and 
whether the removal of short-selling restrictions affects stock-price volatility. If they consume 
liquidity, they may be more destabilizing on average. If prices become less volatile after the 
removal of short-selling restrictions, one could conclude that they improve financial market 
stability. 
4 Data Definition and Construction 
The data covers the time period between January 2005 and December 2005. All variables are 
expressed in daily frequency. Daily stock returns, closing stock-prices, the number of shares 
outstanding and four-digit SIC codes are from CRSP. Firm size is measured by the market 
capitalization defined as the product of the shares outstanding and the closing stock price. Stock-
level volatility is defined as squared daily returns while market-level volatility is captured by the 
new methodology VIX index.12 Momentum returns are the cumulative daily returns over the past 
five trading days and tick size is measured by the inverse of the stock-price. Industry 
                                                 
12 The new methodology VIX index is downloaded from the website of the CBOE: 
http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/introduction.aspx. 
classification is based on the 48 -industries, which are condensed to 19 industry groups. The one-
month Treasury bill rate as the risk-free rate and the Fama and French (1993)-factors (SMB, 
HML, and the return on the market in excess of the risk-free rate) are retrieved from the Fama-
French database on WRDS. Daily abnormal stock returns are calculated as the residual of a 
regression of daily stock returns in excess to the risk-free rate on the three -factors. Market-
adjusted stock returns are calculated as the residual of a regression of daily excess stock returns 
on market excess returns. 
Non-missing COMPUSTAT data are winsorized at the first top and bottom percentile and 
missing items are set to zero. These data are used to calculate the book-to-market ratio, defined as 
the sum of common equity (item 60), investment tax credits (item 208), and deferred taxes (item 
74) less the total value of preferred shares (items 56, 130, and 175) divided by firm size. 
Research and development (hereafter R&D) expenses are calculated as the ratio of research and 
development expenses (item 46) to total sales (item 12). Capital expenditures (hereafter Capex) 
are defined as the ratio of capital expenditures (item 128) to total sales. 
Quarterly earnings announcement dates are downloaded from I/B/E/S. Post 
announcement returns are alternatively calculated as the cumulative sum of daily stock returns, 
daily market-adjusted returns, or daily abnormal returns during the five days following and 
including the announcement day. 
Intra-day TAQ data are used to calculate daily stock-level bid-ask spreads as the time-
weighted daily average of the intra-day NBBO percentage spread. The trade direction for each 
transaction is inferred using the Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm, which matches trades with 
quotes posted at least five seconds before the trade is executed. Daily share order-imbalance is 
the net of all shares bought and sold on a particular day. Standardized inventory is calculated as 
the share order-imbalance multiplied by minus one and normalized to a stock-level mean of zero 
and standard deviation of one. Dollar order-imbalance is calculated as the residual from a 
regression of the daily U.S. dollar volume sold short scaled by firm size on the net of daily U.S. 
dollar volume bought and sold also scaled by firm size. 
The TAQ Reg SHO data set provides, for NYSE-listed stocks, the timing, price, and share 
volume of short-sales together with an indicator showing whether a particular transaction is 
exempt from short-selling restrictions.13 The daily U.S. dollar volume sold short is calculated as 
the daily sum of the product of the transaction price and the number of shares sold short. Short 
turnover is calculated as the ratio of U.S. dollar volume sold short to firm size. Matching regular 
TAQ data with TAQ Reg SHO by the time-stamp, allows identifying the exchange where a 
particular batch of stocks has been sold short. We simplify the trade-venue information to trades 
done on the NYSE, NYSE trades, and Off-NYSE trades.14 The list of pilot stocks that are 
permanently exempt from short-selling restrictions as part of Reg SHO is available on the NYSE 
web site.15 
To be included in the CRSP-sample, a stock needs to be ordinary common stock of a U.S. 
firm with main listing on the NYSE that is not a trust, a closed-end fund, or a REIT. The TAQ-
sample excludes data with the time-stamp earlier than 9:30 AM or later than 4:00 PM. In 
addition, price, quote, and volume data that are out of sequence, with special settlement 
conditions, that are corrected, negative, or that lead to bid-ask spreads that are negative, above 
five U.S. dollars, or larger than 40 percent of the quote mid-point are excluded. To be included in 
the final sample, each daily stock-level observation is required to have TAQ and CRSP data and 
                                                 
13 Trades identified as being exempt from short-selling restrictions may sometimes contain a non-exempt portion, 
which the data set does not allow to disentangle. Note that these trades do not refer to short-sales of pilot stocks. 
Trades that are only temporarily exempt from short-selling restrictions are referred to as “exempt trades”. 
14 The (known) trade direction of short-sales is superimposed on the direction inferred from the -algorithm. It turns 
out that the Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm has a tendency to classify short-sales as buys. This is likely the result of 
short-sellers to sometimes set their quotes a whisker above the quote mid-point to induce an up-tick, which improves 
the likelihood of their order getting executed. By superimposing the known trade direction of short-sales on the data-
set where the trade-direction is inferred using the Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm, we correct for this problem. 
Alternatively, Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) improve the Lee-and-Ready algorithm for Nasdaq data by using 
the tick-rule for all trades that do not exactly hit the bid or ask quote. Whether this adjustment also works for hybrid 
markets, such as the NYSE, is not clear, however.  
15 See: http://www.nyse.com/regulation/memberorganizations/regsho.shtml. 
to be in COMPUSTAT. The resulting data set has daily observations for 1,485 individual stocks. 
Market averages of bid-ask spreads, momentum-returns, order-imbalance, turnover, and 
information content of short-sales are calculated as the market capitalization-weighted average 
across the intersection of the CRSP-sample and TAQ-sample. 
The information content of short-sales is captured by a direct measure of the adverse 
selection loss of the counter-party to the short-seller. In the absence of private information, this 
measure should be zero on average. Presuming that the counter-party of a short-sale has, on 
average, all publicly available information, this is a trade-based measure of the information 
content of a short-sale transaction on a high frequency basis. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and 
Huang and Stoll (1996), for instance, use a similar measure to capture adverse selection losses. 
The latter use the difference of the quote mid-point at the time of the transaction and the 
transaction price some time later. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) or Huang and Stoll (1996) use 
the scaled difference of the transaction price and the quote mid-point over a fixed time interval to 
improve the comparability over unequally spaced transaction times. We use a measure based on 
Naik and Yadav (2003), who replace transaction prices by the quote mid-point and thereby 
address trade-price related problems due to the bid-ask bounce:16 
( ) ,t t T t tIA D M M M= −      (1) 
where Dt is the trade direction and Mt and MT are the quote mid-points when the trade is 
submitted at time t and a later point in time, T. Taking the daily trade size-weighted average, this 
measure is fairly robust as it consists of many data-points and allows the inclusion of trade size as 
an additional information-related variable. Following Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), quotes 
in effect five seconds before the reference trade are used.17 
                                                 
16 See Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) for empirical biases that can arise from the bid-ask bounce. 
17 This paper makes use of time intervals of 15, 30, and 60 minutes, and one up to ten trading days matched with the 
reference transaction by the second. 
Employing a return measure, which IA represents, to capture the information contents of 
short sales has also been employed by Boehmer et al. (2006). The advantage of our method is 
that it looks at shorter time horizons from intra-day to one week, whereas  consider a monthly 
horizon. This allows us to investigate the information characteristics of short sales more closely, 
which we find to differ most substantially from regular transactions intraday. In addition, using a 
stock-level variable allows us to construct further stock-level measures of the information 
characteristics of short sales, such as the level of information derived from market-wide and 
stock-specific information. 
Summary statistics are shown in Table 2. The numbers in the column Obs. of capital 
expenditure, R&D expenses, and block-ownership are much lower than the numbers of the other 
stock-level data as the summary statistics only use unique observations. As balance sheet data are 
typically updated once every fiscal year, there are only between 1,000 and 2,000 unique 
observations of these data items. Likewise, as the market-environment variables are the cross-
sectional averages of the daily realization of the respective stock-level variables, there are only 
252 individual observations for each of the market-level data series, which corresponds to the 
number of trading days. The sample contains over 5,000 post-announcement return observations, 
suggesting that there are four earnings announcements for almost all stocks in the sample. 
Average raw announcement returns are positive but drop to zero when adjusted for the three -
factors. The average monthly momentum returns are also positive. The large difference between 
means and medians of share order-imbalance, bid-ask spreads, firm size, capital expenditure, 
research and development expenses, and block-ownership suggest that these data are fairly 
skewed. 
More importantly, the information characteristics of short sales therefore appear to be 
different from the information characteristics of regular transactions. This surprising 
characteristic is investigated more in-depth in the subsequent sections. The data reveal that short-
sellers make losses intra-day, which is different to average IA-values calculated across buy and 
sell transactions over intra-day horizons (see Table 2). 
5 Analysis of Short-sales 
This section initially characterizes the information content of short-sales in general and around 
firm-specific information events in particular. Subsequently, we look at whether short-sellers’ 
private information is based on market-wide and stock-specific insights and what the relative 
importance of each of these pieces of information is. Finally, we evaluate whether short-sales are 
a positive or negative contribution to financial markets by looking at the impact of short sales on 
liquidity and how the partial suspension of shorts-selling restrictions affected price efficiency. 
5.1 General Information Characteristics of Short-sales 
Figure 1 and Table 2 provide the empirical distribution and summary statistics of IA for short 
sales, regular sales, and buys estimated over several horizons. IA should be evenly distributed 
around zero if short-sales are completely uninformed. It turns out that IA of short sales, buys and 
regular sales is roughly symmetrically distributed around zero with slightly more weight in the 
positive half of the distribution (see Panels A and B in Figure 1), which is consistent with the 
positive means and medians of IA over the same horizons (see Table 2), indicating that traders, 
whether they use short sales or regular transactions, have some private information on average. 
The shape of the IA distribution of short sales differs from the shape of regular sales and buys, 
however. Looking at the different horizons over which IA is estimated, we observe that the IA 
distribution of short-sales remains fairly symmetrically shaped which is not the case for the IA 
distribution of regular sales and buys. The distribution of intraday IA of regular sales and buys is 
positively skewed while IA of short-sales is negatively (see also Table 2). This suggests that these 
trades carry more short-term information than short sales do. 
Over longer horizons, however, we observe that the IA distribution has fatter tails 
demonstrated by the substantially larger kurtosis statistics (see Table 2) as compared to short 
sales, suggesting that large positive and negative IA is more common for short sales than with 
regular sales and buys. This in turn suggests that these transactions carry less information over 
longer horizons than short sales as the mass of their IA distribution is more strongly centered 
around zero as for short sales, which is also suggested by the mean and median values shown in 
Table 2. Furthermore, the annualized mean values show that the information contents of short 
sales rises until levels off at the horizon of five days, whereas the information contents of regular 
sales and buys decreases steadily the longer the IA horizon, which suggests that the information 
horizon of short-sellers is typically several days long whereas the information horizon of regular 
transactions is much shorter. 
The characteristics of short-sellers’ private information therefore seems to be different 
from the information set regular traders have, which is also supported by the highly significant 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic to test the null hypothesis of equality in medians between short-
sales and the regular buys and sales.18 While making larger gains over longer horizons, short-
sellers seem to lose intraday, which is contrary to the finding of  and potentially reflects the 
difference in market structure between the ASX and the NYSE. In addition, the pattern of IA 
suggests that although short-sellers typically turn over their positive quicker then long-only 
investors19, informed short-sellers hold their positions for at least one trading session. This seems 
reasonable given the additional complications in establishing short positions (see D’Avolio 
(2002)) that may inhibit quick intra-day turnover. 
                                                 
18 We also run a paired observation t-test. As the distribution of the difference between IA of short-sales and IA of 
regular buys and sales calculated over the same horizon is highly non-normal, a non-parametric test, such as the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, seems more appropriate. 
19 The life time of the average short position is about 37 days while the average long position has a lifetime of about 
1.2 years (Boehmer, et al. (2006)). 
Panel A of Table 2 further shows that the difference in the level of private information 
between short-sellers and regular traders depends on liquidity, the systematic risk of the firm, and 
the firm-size. In particular, for short-horizons, short-sellers appear to be less informed than 
regular traders the larger the systematic risk (measured by the market beta), the higher the book-
to-market value, and the higher the tick-size, and the lower the liquidity and the firm size. Some 
of these factors may reflect the difficulty that short-sellers have to quickly exploit their private 
information (e.g., liquidity, firm-size, and tick-size) which puts them at a disadvantage relative to 
regular traders. The fact that this relationship mostly reverts if one increases the IA horizon 
suggests that short-sellers may not be simply less skilled than the other traders but may exploit 
their information differently, which in addition may have a different life-span as compared to 
regular traders. 
Furthermore, the negative intra-day IA means that, on average, short-sellers do not seem 
to precipitate price declines, as this would result in a positive intra-day IA suggesting that 
destabilizing short-sellers as modeled by Shiloh (2007) are only a minority. Short-sellers seem to 
benefit from a price reversal, which is even more surprising given that the overall average stock 
returns over the sample period are positive (see Panel C of Table 2). This suggests some 
preliminary evidence that short-sellers possess some skill to time their trades. Large surprises, 
however, do not seem to be anticipated more often by short sellers as it is by regular traders, as 
the average IA for transactions one or two standard deviations away from the firm-level mean is, 
if anything, slightly smaller for short sales (see Table 2). This issue is further investigated in the 
following section. 
Looking at the different trade types, it appears that their information characteristics differ 
substantially. Looking at Table 3, Off-NYSE trades seem to have a lower level of information 
content consistent with the “cream-skimming” by Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997). Exempt 
trades seem have a comparatively low level of information content, are relatively large, and have 
a low trading frequency. It therefore seems that these trades are mainly used for inventory 
management or hedging purposes. Trades with similar characteristics also seem to be more likely 
to be routed to exchanges other than the NYSE, suggesting that Off-NYSE short-sales more likely 
to be used for inventory management and hedging. Non-pilot stocks have a larger variation in the 
information content of short-sales. Table 3 also shows that only the difference in IA in 
information contents of short-sales between pilot and non-pilot stocks is statistically significant. 
This demonstrates the strong impact of the up-tick rule on the informational efficiency of markets 
and the ability of short-sellers to exploit their private information. This suggests that that prices 
of non-pilot stocks are less efficient, which is going to be investigated in Section 5.4.2. 
5.2 Is Short-sellers Private Information Stock-specific or Market-wide? 
Although we fail to find evidence for insider information in the information contents of short-
sales, our results point at one potentially important source of information advantage: public 
information. As this information can be specific to an individual firm (e.g., earnings 
announcements) or apply to many firms (e.g., the release of economic data), we continue with an 
analysis of the relative importance of private information that is security specific versus private 
information that is based on market-wide factors. 
 As a first step in this investigation, we relate short-volume to market-wide returns and 
returns that are specific to the individual stock. The strength of this relationship is meant to give a 
first impression on how much trading of short sellers is related to stock-specific or market-wide 
information. For this purpose, we regress short volume on returns on the market and stock-
specific returns.20 Results in Panel A of Table 4 show that short-volume is significantly related to 
stock-specific returns but not to market-wide returns. This relationship seems to apply only to 
trades that are not exempt from short-selling restrictions and are done on the NYSE. As these two 
                                                 
20 The results presented here are based on stock-specific returns calculated using the Fama-French three factor 
model. Using only the market factor, adding the momentum factor, or using equally-weighted instead of value-
weighted market returns does not affect the results.  
transaction types arguably carry most of the information, one can conclude that this regression 
captures the information contents of short sales.  
It therefore seems that short-sellers do possess information relating to individual firms 
rather than information that relates to the market as a whole. However, the fact that this 
relationship is strongest when the coefficients are aggregated on a value-weighted basis as 
compared to equally-weighted averaging suggests that short sales in large stocks carry most 
information. These stocks tent to issue more information to the market-place than smaller firms, 
suggesting that short sellers are simply reacting to public information – of which there is more for 
larger firms – rather than exploiting insider knowledge which would suggest that the relationship 
between short volume and returns should be at least equally pronounced with smaller firms.21 
Finally, this relationship between returns and volume cannot be found for regular buys and sales, 
suggesting that short-sellers have a different information set as compared to the other market 
participants. 
Inducing the importance of market-wide information relative to firm-specific one as a 
source to private information from a market-model may be fairly noisy due to the importance of 
mechanical market-wide trading strategies that typically do not use private information.22 In 
addition, using total returns as a proxy for the information contents of short sales is fairly 
imprecise. We therefore use a two-step procedure where market-wide trading volume is first 
separated from the security-specific volume. The volume attributable to these different sources of 
information is subsequently related to the information contents of each trade to determine the 
                                                 
21 Similarly, lagging either short volume or returns (results not shown but available on request) shows that the 
strength of this relationship declines as the lags increase. This is further evidence that short sellers react to – rather 
than successfully forecast – value-relevant information. Also, the effect is much weaker if short-volume is measured 
in units of USD – rather than the number of trades as in Panel A of Table 4 – which shows that there is considerable 
noise in the measurement of informed short-volume, which we attempt to address with the subsequent statistical test.  
22 These trades, also referred to as program trades, “encompass a range of portfolio- trading strategies involving the 
purchase or sale of a basket of at least 15 stocks with a total value of $1 million or more” (NYSE (2007a)). Based on 
weekly data, the mean fraction of program trades to all regular buys and sales on the NYSE is 29% using the current 
method of volume reporting that accounts for short-selling activity (NYSE (2007b)). 
importance of each source of information to informed trader. Therefore, the following intra-day 
regression for every day and stock individually: 
, ,0 ,1 , ,i d i i d i dVolume MVolumeθ θ ω= + +     (2) 
where Volumei,d is the trading volume in stock i during one-minute interval d and MVolumed is 
the market average volume during the same one-minute interval. Security-specific and market-
wide volume is calculated as ( ),0 ,0ˆ ˆi iθ ω+  and ( ),1iˆ dMVolumeθ , respectively. The estimated 
security-specific and market-wide volume is then scaled by total daily stock-level volume, which 
results in the relative importance of market-wide and stock-level trading activity. These ratios are 
then related to the information content of the same transactions during the corresponding intra-
day interval: 
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where IAi,d is the information content of either short-sales, regular sales, or regular buys in stock i 
during one-minute interval d. The estimated daily stock-level intercepts αi,1 and αi,2 are the 
information content attributed to security-specific and market-wide trading, respectively.  
Results in Panels B of Table 4 show that around two thirds of the information content of 
short-sales can be attributable to security-specific short-selling.23 Panel B of Table 4 shows that 
the typical (median) short-sale transaction makes $11 over five days from market-wide short-
selling and $26 from security-specific short-selling, while the median transaction size is about 
$14,000 (see Table 2). Thus, private information based on market-wide factors generates a return 
                                                 
23 Results are robust to the definition of volume and the time horizon. Using equally-weighted instead of market 
value-weighted market averages or using equally-weighted instead of trade size-weighted one-minute interval 
averages or the intra-interval sum does not materially affect the results. Using trade sized-weighted IA is more 
consistent with the definition of IA and therefore presented here. Using intraday volume scaled by total daily volume 
instead of dollar volume or turnover does not affect the results, either. 
of 7.9 basis points and private information based on stock-level factors a generates a return over 
five days 18.6 basis points over the same horizon; this corresponds to an annual return of 4.0% 
and 9.7%, respectively. 
Both sources of information therefore generate a reasonable return to informed investors. 
It also appears that there is little variation in the relative importance of security-specific or 
market-wide information across firm-characteristics (results not reported but available on 
request). However, there is considerable variation in the relative importance of security-specific 
short-selling across trade-types (see Panel C of Table 4). Between two thirds and four fifths of 
the information content of short-sales of pilot stocks are security-specific, while the other trade-
types (trades routed on and off the NYSE, non-pilot stocks, exempt trades, and non-exempt 
trades) show a relative importance of security-specific short-sales similar to the overall sample 
shown in Panel B of Table 4. This shows again that short-sellers in pilot stocks can react more 
quickly to stock-level changes in the trading environment whereby informed short-sellers do not 
seem to discriminate between trading venue. 
5.3 Short-sales around Stock-specific Information Events 
To investigate whether short-sellers possess private firm-specific information, we look at the 
information contents of short-selling around the publication of earnings announcements. In 
particular, we regress the information contents of short sales, buys and regular sales on a dummy 
variable that is one indicates when the particular IA value refers to a short sale and zero 
otherwise:  
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whereby ShortDummy is a dummy being one if IAi,t refers to short sales and zero otherwise. 
PilotDummy is a dummy if stock i is a pilot stock and zero otherwise. NYSEVOL is the short 
volume traded on the NYSE standardized using the non-parametric method of normal scores.  
Results presented in Panel A of Table 5 show that short sales traded on the announcement 
date are not particularly informed, if anything the IA loading is negative, suggesting that over a 
short horizon, short sellers lose money on these dates, which is similar to the regular trading 
dates. The intercept, which subsumes the information contents of regular transactions is positive 
intraday, suggesting that among the regular buyers and sellers, there are some traders that make 
consistent profits in these periods. Looking at longer return horizon, we can see that the 
information content is higher on average with non-pilot stocks, suggesting that prices in these 
stocks are informationally less efficient. Also, above average volume on the NYSE is 
significantly positive for longer horizons suggesting that the long-term informed short sales are 
mainly done on the NYSE. A similar picture emerges a day prior to the announcement, though 
the low explanatory power of the regressions may flag caution in interpreting too much into these 
results. 
The weakness of the results could be related to the fact that short-sellers only care about 
one particular type of earnings announcement: negative surprises. We therefore group the volume 
of short-sales, regular buys and sales into buckets based on the cross-sectional rank of the size of 
the earnings surprise. Results in Panel B of Table 5 show that transaction volumes in short-sales 
are somewhat higher concurrent to negative surprises but not much different to normal volume 
prior to the announcement. This is in contrast to the volume of regular buys and sales, where the 
volume significantly elevated even prior to the announcement. Our results therefore suggest that 
short-sellers, similar to traders using regular transactions, are not using insider information 
around earnings announcements. If anything, they seem to be analyzing public information on the 
day of the announcement to derive their private information for informed sales in line with the 
skilled information analyst in Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997). 
Unlike regular sale transactions, short-selling activity is above average also on days of 
positive announcement surprises. This suggests that short-sellers provide liquidity when positive 
information is released. As Table 2 shows that short-sellers have private information on average, 
this suggests that – while not relying on insider information and while supplying liquidity during 
positive news events – informed short-sellers have other sources of private information apart 
from firm-specific insider information. Our results therefore suggest that short-sellers supply 
liquidity to the market – which allows them to earn the bid-ask spread – while additionally 
focusing on long-term gains rather than short term gains that arise from temporary price pressures 
that are unrelated to fundamental value. 
5.4 Are Short-sellers a Positive or Negative Contribution to Financial Markets? 
Thus far, we found that short-sellers, while exploiting private information, do not rely on insider 
information as a basis of their trades. Rather, it seems that they use public information, both firm-
specific and market-wide, as a basis of their trades. The patters of information contents of short 
sellers exhibited in Table 2 shows that the private information short-sellers use is most useful for 
return horizons of at least five days. All these evidence suggests that short-sellers are value 
traders as defined by , unlike regular buyers and sellers, as they seem to sacrifice short-term gain 
to profit over the longer term. We further investigate this first impression by looking at how 
short-sellers affect financial market liquidity, followed by a study of short-sellers impact on 
financial market liquidity. 
5.4.1 Short-sales and Financial Market Liquidity 
One of the prominent features of value traders as defined by  is that they supply liquidity at times 
when uninformed buying or selling pressure moves prices away from fundamentals. It is 
therefore further investigated whether short-sellers absorb buying pressure and thus provide 
short-term liquidity by estimating a regression of short-selling volume on the level of liquidity 
providers’ inventory of the previous day and some control variables: 
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where ShortVolumei,t represents the U.S. dollar volume sold short on day t of stock i scaled by the 
yearly average trading volume and normalized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
Inventoryi,t–1 is the level of liquidity providers’ inventories in stock i on the previous day. 
InventoryDummyj,i,t–1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if market maker’s inventory level 
of stock i at date t–1 is in inventory-size group j and zero otherwise. Inventory-size groups are 
defined as the stock-level inventory quintiles. TradeTypeDummyk,i,t is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the short-volume data of stock i on day t refers to trade-type k and zero 
otherwise.24 FutureReturni,t is the return investors earn from holding stock i from day t over the 
next month. 
If short-sellers provide liquidity in response to buying pressure, one could expect to find a 
negative regression coefficient on inventory, showing that shorts sellers sell more when 
                                                 
24 To avoid co-linearity problems in regression (2.d), short-volume data sets of each of the six trade-types are stacked 
on top of each other. These daily stock-level trade-types are calculated (1) across trades routed to the NYSE, (2) 
across trades routed off the NYSE, (3) across trades that are exempt from short-selling restrictions, (4) across trades 
that are not exempt from short-selling restrictions, (5) across trades of pilot stocks, and (6) across trades of non-pilot 
stocks. Trades of non-pilot stocks are the base level. 
inventory-levels of liquidity providers fall.25 The negative relationship between the level of 
inventory and short volume (see Table 6) confirms the expectation that, consistently across trade-
type, short-sellers step in to provide additional liquidity when inventory levels of liquidity 
providers are low. As presented in Table 6, the relationship between inventory and exempt trades 
is comparatively weak. This indicates that changes in orderflow of exempt trades are less strongly 
related to fluctuations in inventory than changes in orderflow of the other trade-types. It is likely 
that these trades are mostly routed to trading venues other than the NYSE as short-selling activity 
outside the NYSE seems also to be hardly affected by the level of liquidity providers’ inventory 
positions. This is consistent with the “cream-skimming” hypothesis put forward by Bessembinder 
and Kaufman (1997) as trades that are exempt and routed to alternative trading venues have a 
lower level of information content (see Table 3). 
Looking at the absolute size of the regression coefficient and the R-square, it appears that 
pilot stocks have a slightly stronger relationship with inventory than non-pilot stocks. 
Considering that non-pilot stocks have a larger variation in the information content of short-sales 
(see Table 3), these results suggests that prices of non-pilot stocks are less efficient (see the next 
section for a formal test of this issue). It therefore seems that short-selling restrictions reduce the 
effectiveness of short-sellers to provide liquidity to uninformed traders and to impound private 
information into prices. Next to reducing price efficiency, short-selling restrictions could 
therefore raise the costs of trading, which may even affect the costs of capital. 
The positive loading on average volume is as expected showing that short-sellers tend to 
provide more liquidity in actively traded securities, which typically are also more efficiently 
priced. Short-sales in stocks that are less heavily traded and less efficiently priced are thus likely 
to carry more insider-related idiosyncratic private information, consistent with  who find that 
                                                 
25 This regression has been estimated in U.S. dollar terms and units of shares, which alternatively have been used as 
is or scaled by the total trading volume, defined as the sum of short sales, long buys, and regular sales. As results are 
very similar, only figures where un-scaled U.S. dollar volume is used are reported. 
insider trades in small firms carry more information than insider trades in stocks of larger firms. 
This implies that -type short-sellers who provide liquidity to uninformed buying pressure are 
relatively more important the larger the firm becomes. Therefore, short-sales seem to be based on 
several trade motives. Table 6 shows that lower levels of inventory make short-sellers trading 
more. This further confirms the hypothesis that short-sellers provide liquidity to the market when 
liquidity providers see their inventory move away from their average level. 
Looking more closely at the coefficients, it appears that the relationship between short-
selling activity and inventory is U-shaped. Consistent with orderflow models of information 
dissemination (see, e.g., Lyons (2001)), very high selling pressure may indicate that fundamental 
values have changed downward while intermediate level selling pressure constitutes mostly 
uninformed orderflow that short-sellers help accommodate. To ascertain this conjecture, 
regression (6.b) is estimated by including future changes in asset value as additional explanatory 
variable next to inventory and average trading volume. Future changes in asset value, 
approximated by the log-difference of the concurrent stock price and the stock price in one month 
are considered to capture changes in fundamental value. A one-month interval is chosen to ensure 
all value-relevant price-signals that short-sellers may trade on are fully reflected in prices. In 
addition, a longer return interval helps to avoid concurrent uninformed price-pressure to affect 
the proxy of changes in fundamental value. 
If fundamental values are indeed revised downward on days with the largest inventory, 
one should see a negative coefficient on the interaction of the inventory dummy for inventory 
size group 5 and future changes in asset value. Average monthly CRSP returns are positive26 and 
short-selling volume associated with size group 5 is lower than the average volume associated 
                                                 
26 Mean monthly returns in 2005 of the data sample are 0.6% with a t-statistic of 9.6 for a test of zero mean. To be 
consistent with the measure of future change in asset value, returns unadjusted for dividends are used. 
with inventor size group 1 (see Table 6). This implies that a negative association between short 
volume and changes in fundamental value are not necessarily a foregone conclusion. 
Results in Table 6 show a significantly negative regression coefficient on future changes 
in asset value. Thus, the information-related advantage of informed short-sellers appears to rest 
on an understanding of the trading environment, which allows these traders to react to buying 
pressure to profitably provide additional liquidity. In addition, as information about value-
relevant fundamentals is typically revealed over a time horizon longer than one day  (e.g., see 
Keim and Madhavan (1995)) informed short-sellers also seem to have private information about 
fundamentals which may help differentiate between informed and uninformed orderflow. They 
therefore differentiate informed from uninformed buying pressure and avoid trading when 
fundamental values rise while they seem to increase their positions when fundamental values fall. 
5.4.2 Short-sales Price Efficiency 
To investigate directly how short-sales affect price efficiency, we calculate various measures of 
price efficiency for the pilot sample and the non-pilot stocks individually. We therefore conduct a 
variance-ratio test following  using a set of sampling frequencies to subdivide our year of data. 
The number that the resulting ratio deviates from unity can be interpreted as the return auto-
correlation. Table 7 shows that the random walk hypothesis cannot be rejected for neither of pilot 
nor non-pilot stocks. We do find, however, that pilot stocks tend to have a negative auto-
correlation, which is reflected in the mean-reverting price behavior that short-sellers exploit. As  
points out, asset prices where prices are quoted with bid and ask spreads should, if they are 
efficient, experience negative serial auto-correlation. This market set-up also applies to stocks, it 
follows from this that one should expect efficiently prices stocks to have some negative serial 
auto-correlation. As we find negative auto-correlation only for pilot stocks, one could interpret 
this as some evidence for pilot stocks being more efficiently priced than non-pilot stocks that do 
not exhibit negative auto-correlation on average. 
Therefore, while we fail to find strong direct evidence for stock prices to be more efficient 
when short-selling restrictions are revoked; our results provide some tentative evidence that pilot 
stocks may be priced more efficiently than non-pilot stocks. We do find strong evidence, 
however, that short-sellers provide liquidity to the market, which in itself is a positive 
contribution by short-sellers and therefore implies that, overall, stock-markets benefit from short-
selling. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper looks at short-sales, investigates the information content and trade motivation behind 
informed short-sales and compares these with regular buys and sales. Short-sales appear to be an 
important source of liquidity during times of uninformed buying pressure. This appears to make 
short-sales unprofitable intra-day as prices, pushed up by uninformed trading pressure, 
temporarily move against short-sellers’ positions. The reversal of prices provides short-sellers 
with a reasonable return for their liquidity service. To implement this strategy of informed 
liquidity provision, informed short-sellers seem to rely on both, their understanding of the market 
environment and private information about fundamental values. 
Short-sellers exploit negative earnings surprises, which they typically do not seem to 
anticipate, however. Rather, short-sellers appear to react to the public announcement of negative 
surprises, suggesting that the typical short-seller does not have insider information but rather 
appears to be a -type skilled information analyst. Short-selling constraints seem to affect the price 
efficiency, though it appears that prices – even with short-selling restrictions – are fairly 
efficiently priced. Further, investors are more likely to be exposed to informed short-sales when 
trading on the NYSE while short-sales on alternative trading venues are more likely to be used 
for inventory management and hedging purposes. 
Public investors may find the results interesting that trading on exchanges other than the 
NYSE, the avoidance of short-term momentum strategies, and the reduction of trading activity 
during periods of low liquidity may protect them from adverse selection losses associated with 
exposure to informed short-sellers. Informed short-sellers seem not to use corporate insider 
information but rather appear to provide liquidity, which may be an interesting finding for 
regulators. Thus, short-sales are a net positive contribution to the financial markets, as they 
improve price efficiency and provide liquidity that keeps prices from diverging too much from 
fundamentals. 
Among the limitations of this study is the short time horizon, although the large number 
of daily and intra-daily observations that are used imply sufficient statistical validity of the 
empirical results. It would be interesting to investigate further in future research one of the main 
issues looked at in this paper, i.e., the contribution of short-selling restrictions to price efficiency 
and financial market stability. In particular, looking at short-selling trading patters in pilot and 
non-pilot stocks during market downturns could improve the understanding about the benefits 
and costs of short-selling restrictions. 
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Figure 1 – Distribution of Information Content of Short-sales 
This figure shows the empirical distribution of the information content of short-sales normalized for each firm individually over 
various horizons. Panel A shows the distribution of short sales and Panel B shows the distribution of regular sales and buys 
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Short Sales - Information Contents over 5 days
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.7
3.0
-4
.0
5
-3
.6
8
-3
.3
0
-2
.9
3
-2
.5
5
-2
.1
8
-1
.8
0
-1
.4
3
-1
.0
5
-0
.6
8
-0
.3
0
0.
08
0.
45
0.
83
1.
20
1.
58
1.
95
2.
33
2.
70
3.
08
3.
45
3.
83
Standardized IA
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
Short Sales -Information Contents over 10 days
0.0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.7
3.0
-4
.0
5
-3
.6
8
-3
.3
0
-2
.9
3
-2
.5
5
-2
.1
8
-1
.8
0
-1
.4
3
-1
.0
5
-0
.6
8
-0
.3
0
0.
08
0.
45
0.
83
1.
20
1.
58
1.
95
2.
33
2.
70
3.
08
3.
45
3.
83
Standardized IA
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(%
)
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics Explanatory Variables 
This table lists the names of the variables used in this paper in column Variable Name and the definition used to construct 
the respective variable in the column Definition. 
Variable Definition 
Abnormal returns The residual from a regression of daily stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate on daily market excess returns 
and the SMB and HML factor returns during the time-period covered by this study. 
Announcement surprise The cumulative post-announcement returns during the five days that follow the announcement including the 
announcement day. 
AvVolume The yearly average of total daily dollar trading volume of a particular stock. 
Beta The stock-level beta calculated using the Fama and French (1992) methodology.  
Bid-ask spread The daily time-weighted average of the intra-day difference between the BBO quotes scaled by the quote-mid 
point. 
BTM The sum of common equity, investment tax credits, and deferred taxes less the total value of preferred shares 
divided by firm size. 
Dollar imbalance The residual from a stock-level regression of dollar imbalance on Turnover. 
Dollar volume The daily sum of the $ trade volume in the stocks of a particular firm. 
Firm size The daily market capitalization measured as the product of total shares outstanding and the closing stock price. 
FutureReturn The return in a particular stock over the next month and is calculated as the first difference of the logarithm of the 
stock price today and the logarithm of the last valid stock price observation exactly one month later than today.  
IA The daily trade size-weighted average of the difference between the quote mid-point right before a transaction and 
the quote mid-point some minutes or trading days later scaled by the first quote mid-point.  
IAi,d The Trade size-weighted mean (or the Sum) of IA of all short-sales (or buys or regular sales) during one-minute 
intra-day interval d. IA is multiplied by the trade size and thus expressed in dollars if Dollar Volume is used on the 
right hand side of the regression in Panels B and C in Table 4. 
Inventory The level of inventory of liquidity providers a particular stock. This is approximated by the net daily number of 
shares bought and sold multiplied by minus the closing stock price and is normalized for each stock individually to 
a mean of zero and a variance of one.  
InventoryDummyj A dummy variable that is equal to one if the level of inventory in a particular stock is in inventory-size group j and 
zero otherwise. Inventory size Groups 1 to 5 are defined as the five inventory quintiles evaluated on the individual 
stock-level with Group 1 being the lowest inventory.  
Market-adjusted returns The residual from a regression of daily stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate on daily market excess returns. 
Market-adjusted short volume The standardized stock-level short-selling volume less the market value-weighted average standardized relative 
short-selling volume of that day.  
MIA The market value-weighted average IA. 
Momentum returns The compounded daily returns over the past five days. 
MVolumed The market value-weighted average of the Trade size-weighted mean (or Sum) of the volume sold short, bought, or 
regularly sold during one-minute intra-day interval d. 
Post-announcement returns Captured alternatively by Raw Returns or Abnormal Returns, which are calculated as the residual from a regression 
of stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate on market excess returns and the SMB and HML factor returns.  
Raw returns Daily stock returns. 
Relative Volume The ratio of short Dollar Volume to total daily dollar trading volume.  
Returns (cumul.) around 
announcements 
The cumulative return during the five days that follow quarterly earnings announcements. 
Share order-imbalance The net number of shares bought and sold during a particular day. 
ShortVolume The dollar volume sold short scaled by the total trading volume on that day. 
Tick size The inverse of the daily stock price. 
Trade-type This variable specifies the short-sale data set considered, which comprises either All trades, only NYSE trades, 
only short-sales routed Off-NYSE, only short-sales that are Exempt from short-selling restrictions, only short-sales 
that are Non-exempt from short-selling restrictions, short-sales of stocks that are part of the Reg SHO Pilot sample, 
and short-sales of stocks that are not part of the pilot sample (referred to as Non-pilot). 
TradeTypeDummyk A dummy variable that is one if the short-volume data of a particular stock refer to trade-type k and zero otherwise. 
Turnover Defined as Dollar volume scaled by the daily market capitalization of a firm. 
Volume The US-Dollar value traded during a day. 
Volumei,d The trade size-weighted mean of the volume sold short,  bought or sold (measured alternatively by Dollar Volume, 
Relative Volume, or Turnover) in stock i during one-minute intra-day interval d. 
Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics of the data used in this study. Panel A reports the number of Observations, the Mean and 
Median values and the first and third quartile (Q1 and Q3) of the IA, dollar volume, and turnover data used in this study. The 
statistics are based on firm-level means. The columns Data Type and Variable indicate the broad area the respective variable 
refers to and the variable name, respectively. Appended to the variable names in parentheses are the units of measurement, 
whereby 10,000 $ and bp denote ten thousand dollars and basis points, respectively. Skew and Kurt is the mean of the firm-level 
skewness and kurtosis values. IA measures the information content of Short-sales or of Other Trades, defined as the value-
weighted average of long buys and sales not classified as shorts by firms that also have short sales data on the particular date. 
The columns % positive, % > 1 σ, and % > 2 σ denote the mean percentage of firm-level IA observations that are positive, 
more than 1 standard deviation and more than 2 standard deviations above the firm-level mean-IA, respectively. The column 
Annualized shows the IA values calculated over at least one day annualized to make the measure better comparable across 
horizons assuming a 250 day-count. The column P-val shows the p-value of a non-parametric two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test of 
equality in medians between the short-sales IA and the IA of regular buys and sales estimated over the same horizon. Panel B 
shows the Mean and Median difference (in basis points) between IA of short sales and the IA of regular buys and sales (which 
are grouped together) by Quintiles (with 1 being the smallest and 5 the largest group) based on Firm size, Beta, Book-to-
Market, the Bid-ask spread, Tick-size, Volume, and the Number of trades. Volume and the Number of trades are calculated over 
the sum of short-sales, and regular buys and sales. Panel C shows the number of observations (Obs.), the Mean and Median 
values and the first and third quartile (Q1 and Q3) of the explanatory variables used in this study. The columns Data Type and 
Variable indicate the broad area the respective variable refers to and the variable name, respectively. Appended to the variable 
names in parentheses are the units of measurement, whereby 10,000 $, billion $, %, and bp denote ten thousand dollars, billion 
dollars, percentages, and basis points, respectively. See Table 1 for variable definitions 
 
Panel A – Measures of Information Contents 
Data Type Variable Observations Mean Q1 Median Q3 % positive % > 1σ % > 2σ Skew Kurt Annualized P-val
Short sales data IA over 15 minutes (bp) 457,567 -4.99 -5.82 -3.14 -1.71 36.76 8.91 2.10 -27.93 1,569.17 0.00
IA over 30 minutes (bp) 457,567 -4.56 -5.60 -2.82 -1.22 41.30 10.12 2.27 -16.54 1,075.77 0.00
IA over 60 minutes (bp) 457,567 -3.95 -5.55 -2.45 -0.65 44.54 11.14 2.40 -10.23 716.20 0.00
IA over 1 day (bp) 427,908 -0.61 -8.52 -0.85 6.51 49.95 10.68 2.05 39.97 1,771.24 -1.5% 0.00
IA over 2 days (bp) 412,335 2.46 -14.13 0.64 14.50 50.31 11.50 2.18 26.80 914.31 3.1% 0.00
IA over 3 days (bp) 397,872 5.53 -18.74 2.89 23.21 50.61 11.99 2.26 20.89 647.08 4.7% 0.00
IA over 4 days (bp) 381,364 12.74 -20.98 7.79 35.01 51.72 12.33 2.27 14.43 482.96 8.3% 0.00
IA over 5 days (bp) 368,281 19.15 -22.09 11.68 48.31 52.35 12.60 2.32 11.97 387.83 10.0% 0.00
IA over 6 days (bp) 353,202 22.57 -26.48 12.86 57.09 52.13 12.83 2.42 12.15 321.49 9.8% 0.00
IA over 7 days (bp) 329,182 26.56 -32.21 14.14 67.27 52.18 13.18 2.42 11.64 270.25 9.9% 0.00
IA over 8 days (bp) 305,632 27.88 -37.28 14.41 75.03 52.29 13.31 2.37 8.83 233.13 9.1% 0.00
IA over 9 days (bp) 282,032 30.58 -43.73 15.96 86.69 52.67 13.59 2.29 4.71 198.46 8.9% 0.00
IA over 10 days (bp) 258,116 35.92 -48.02 19.52 98.04 52.89 13.88 2.32 4.13 171.49 9.4% 0.00
Dollar volume (10,000 $) 457,567 1.99 0.87 1.41 2.49
Turnover (bp) 457,567 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.13
Regular buys IA over 15 minutes (bp) 457,488 13.31 6.40 9.65 15.02 94.06 10.74 3.32 162.38 1,459.55
and sales IA over 30 minutes (bp) 457,488 13.14 6.29 9.60 14.69 91.59 10.89 3.24 129.48 1,298.57
IA over 60 minutes (bp) 457,488 12.86 6.10 9.25 14.39 87.87 10.82 3.12 101.57 1,277.44
IA over 1 day (bp) 427,846 11.54 4.77 7.72 13.28 70.34 9.09 2.49 37.45 1,827.00 33.4%
IA over 2 days (bp) 412,276 11.55 4.32 7.62 13.74 66.96 8.75 2.56 22.86 1,631.50 15.5%
IA over 3 days (bp) 397,812 11.65 3.84 7.58 14.04 65.28 8.62 2.57 24.23 1,550.19 10.2%
IA over 4 days (bp) 381,306 12.33 4.05 8.08 14.87 64.46 8.79 2.65 26.76 1,385.03 8.0%
IA over 5 days (bp) 368,225 12.66 3.68 8.11 15.79 63.73 8.76 2.70 18.42 1,298.07 6.5%
IA over 6 days (bp) 352,749 12.32 3.27 7.85 15.96 62.90 8.95 2.75 12.99 1,214.50 5.3%
IA over 7 days (bp) 328,756 12.64 2.95 8.16 16.68 62.34 9.06 2.83 17.95 1,114.74 4.6%
IA over 8 days (bp) 305,236 12.26 2.72 8.02 16.68 61.53 9.08 2.81 13.88 1,059.49 3.9%
IA over 9 days (bp) 281,674 12.63 2.20 8.13 17.54 61.41 9.16 2.82 13.39 1,004.84 3.6%
IA over 10 days (bp) 257,790 13.12 1.91 8.53 18.53 61.17 9.36 2.93 9.58 943.05 3.3%
Dollar volume (10,000 $) 457,138 1.32 0.69 1.07 1.70
Turnover (bp) 457,138 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.11  
(continued) 
Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B – Information Contents and Firm Characteristics 
 
Group Decile Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firm size 1 -32.4 -22.5 -24.6 -16.6 -16.9 -9.7 -1.5 8.0 20.5 36.2
2 -16.4 -13.9 -13.1 -9.9 -9.6 -6.7 3.0 6.8 11.9 21.2
3 -11.2 -9.9 -7.5 -6.6 -1.4 -3.1 9.4 7.0 22.5 18.0
4 -8.0 -7.2 -6.0 -5.5 -2.7 -4.6 4.3 2.3 12.5 9.4
5 -4.7 -4.3 -1.3 -1.0 1.8 -1.4 8.5 7.0 18.6 13.4
Beta 1 -12.6 -9.1 -8.2 -6.1 -2.8 -4.7 7.5 4.8 20.6 12.0
2 -12.8 -9.5 -7.8 -7.1 -1.5 -5.4 11.4 4.9 27.7 12.8
3 -11.4 -8.7 -8.6 -7.0 -5.3 -5.3 3.3 2.6 14.2 13.0
4 -17.8 -12.3 -14.4 -8.8 -10.4 -4.2 0.3 11.2 9.0 35.6
5 -18.6 -11.4 -13.7 -7.1 -8.8 -4.1 1.4 9.5 14.2 25.8
Book-to-Market 1 -11.4 -8.1 -6.9 -4.9 2.8 0.0 15.8 11.6 34.2 27.0
2 -10.9 -8.4 -7.0 -5.5 -2.0 -4.5 8.3 5.1 23.3 19.2
3 -12.6 -9.7 -10.6 -7.5 -7.3 -4.9 0.8 5.8 9.6 13.8
4 -15.1 -10.8 -12.0 -8.2 -10.6 -8.4 -1.0 3.3 3.4 11.1
5 -22.6 -13.5 -15.7 -9.8 -11.4 -6.4 0.1 4.6 14.8 20.2
Bid-ask 1 -5.0 -4.7 -1.1 -1.9 3.7 -1.4 12.8 6.1 23.1 10.5
2 -7.5 -7.2 -5.0 -4.3 -0.2 -2.3 5.6 4.4 11.5 10.4
3 -10.7 -9.7 -7.5 -6.8 -4.6 -4.6 4.7 6.7 13.4 17.4
4 -15.9 -14.0 -12.7 -10.2 -9.0 -7.8 3.4 6.9 11.4 22.8
5 -33.4 -23.8 -26.1 -18.1 -18.7 -11.3 -3.0 6.4 26.7 40.3
Tick-size 1 -7.1 -6.3 -1.7 -5.3 7.9 -6.2 22.0 2.9 46.6 11.5
2 -9.4 -8.0 -7.9 -5.6 -5.6 -4.5 1.7 3.3 6.5 8.0
3 -11.5 -9.5 -9.2 -6.2 -7.8 -4.2 0.1 6.8 5.7 16.2
4 -15.3 -11.9 -12.1 -7.7 -9.3 -4.6 -1.7 7.2 3.7 21.6
5 -29.3 -19.0 -21.5 -12.3 -13.8 -4.3 1.5 13.1 22.4 45.1
Volume 1 -30.4 -21.0 -22.3 -14.3 -14.6 -7.0 -1.3 10.8 21.4 37.7
2 -15.5 -12.2 -12.1 -8.5 -7.0 -4.2 2.7 7.4 13.1 25.5
3 -11.6 -9.3 -8.5 -6.3 -6.3 -3.4 4.7 6.9 8.7 14.0
4 -8.9 -7.2 -6.8 -5.6 -1.6 -4.4 5.5 3.9 12.3 3.7
5 -6.2 -5.0 -2.7 -3.1 1.0 -5.6 12.0 3.0 30.0 14.4
Number of 1 -29.4 -19.1 -19.2 -11.8 -7.3 -3.6 7.9 12.6 34.1 36.3
Trades 2 -16.1 -12.3 -13.4 -8.4 -8.7 -4.2 1.9 5.2 14.9 20.2
3 -12.1 -9.7 -9.5 -6.9 -5.1 -4.9 4.8 6.9 9.5 18.5
4 -9.2 -7.4 -7.7 -5.3 -5.5 -3.5 4.6 4.7 15.0 10.1
5 -5.8 -4.6 -2.8 -2.9 -1.9 -7.9 5.0 1.4 14.1 9.3
60 minutes 1 day 10 days
IA of short sales less IA of regular buys and sales over 
3 days 5 days
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Table 2 – Sample Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B – Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis Q1 Median Q3
Share order-imbalance (1,000) 347,942 101.50 189.57 4.6 28.4 11.13 37.79 108.90
Inventory (million $) 313,424 -90.79 177.32 -4.7 33.0 -94.46 -26.19 -6.76
Raw returns (cumul.) around announcements (%) 5,332 0.39 3.01 -0.6 5.3 -0.99 0.47 1.76
Market-adjusted returns (cumul.) around announcements (%) 5,332 -0.05 2.90 -0.6 5.7 -1.34 -0.02 1.24
Abnormal returns (cumul.) around announcements (%) 5,332 0.04 2.82 -0.5 5.4 -1.25 0.04 1.26
Bid-ask spread (bp) 347,942 18.87 27.83 5.7 50.1 6.30 10.46 19.59
Momentum returns (bp) 347,942 20.57 94.53 -4.3 72.0 -10.63 19.57 58.78
Dollar order-imbalance (bp) 347,942 0.03 1.61 15.2 548.6 0.00 0.00 0.00
Volatility (bp) 347,942 4.78 11.77 18.5 422.0 1.81 3.14 5.13
Tick size (%) 347,942 5.58 8.39 6.6 60.9 2.29 3.46 5.59
Firm size (billion $) 347,942 7.39 22.70 9.1 112.7 0.71 1.72 5.01
Book value-to-market value (%) 347,942 57.01 47.04 2.9 11.7 29.14 46.88 68.35
Capital expenditures (%) 1,826 6.96 13.16 4.7 25.3 1.51 3.15 6.61
Research and development (%) 1,616 1.37 4.52 11.0 194.1 0.00 0.00 1.01
Block ownership (%) 1,486 6.96 14.13 2.5 6.7 0.00 0.00 7.00
Bid-ask spread (bp) 252 5.45 0.36 0.9 0.7 5.19 5.39 5.63
Momentum returns (bp) 252 24.43 128.50 -0.2 -0.1 -62.32 30.95 114.46
Order-imbalance (bp) 252 0.04 1.29 -0.4 2.1 -0.80 0.02 0.75
Volatility 252 12.81 1.47 0.7 0.2 11.69 12.52 13.65
Turnover (bp) 252 0.02 0.00 4.1 24.6 0.02 0.02 0.03
Obs.
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Table 3 – Sub-samples of Short-selling Activity and Information Content  
This table shows the median value of the stock-level mean short-selling Dollar Volume and Average IA of short-sales over 15 minutes up to 10 trading days by 
Trade-type. The variable definitions are given in Table 1. The column Daily Observations displays the number of daily stock-level observations. Daily Trades 
shows the median number of short-sales done each day. Dollar Volume is measured in units of $10,000. The row t-statistic shows the t-statistic of the difference 
in mean between each group of trade-types. Thereby, the two-sided independent t-tests (assuming unequal variances) for the trade-type groups Exempt/Non-
exempt and NYSE trades/Off-NYSE are calculated for each stock individually and the statistic shown is the mean across the firm-level t-values. The t-test for the 
trade-type group Pilot/Non-pilot is calculated across all stocks. 
 
Daily Daily Dollar
Trade-type Observations Trades Volume 15 30 60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Exempt 224,008 8.0 4.1 0.35 0.40 -0.07 -3.33 -3.31 -0.93 -0.19 2.03 -5.90 -9.10 -6.51 -6.16 -0.72
Non-exempt 448,837 253.3 1.4 -3.22 -2.85 -2.44 -0.64 0.87 3.10 8.30 11.72 11.06 13.22 12.68 14.13 17.72
t -statistic -0.81 -0.64 -0.39 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.26 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.23
NYSE trades 449,231 268.5 1.4 -3.09 -2.76 -2.41 -0.60 0.71 3.00 8.10 11.62 11.33 12.46 12.37 14.05 17.42
Off-NYSE 255,086 1.7 0.9 -2.72 -2.55 -2.40 -3.37 -2.28 -2.69 2.35 7.38 4.30 6.63 4.15 7.15 7.74
t -statistic -0.06 -0.11 -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02
Pilot 296,994 417.0 2.0 -2.05 -1.77 -1.50 -0.23 0.64 1.99 4.80 7.78 8.74 9.43 9.97 10.57 12.95
Non-pilot 160,573 137.2 1.0 -5.81 -5.47 -5.15 -2.74 0.44 5.30 12.46 18.57 20.30 25.04 25.63 27.52 35.06
t -statistic -37.93 -33.10 -26.08 -2.83 -0.88 0.96 2.32 3.30 3.74 4.15 4.16 4.27 4.54
All trades 457,567 274.1 1.4 -3.14 -2.82 -2.45 -0.85 0.64 2.89 7.79 11.68 12.86 14.14 14.41 15.96 19.52
Average IA of short-sales over
Minutes Days
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Table 4 – Market-wide and Security-specific Short-sales 
This table compares the information content of short-sales based on market-wide signals with short-sales based 
on security-specific signals. Panel A shows the average regression coefficient and t-statistic of a stock-level 
regression of short volume and the volume of regular buys and sales, measured by the number of trades, on a 
constant and Market Returns and Stock-specific Returns. Stock-specific returns are calculated by retaining the 
residual of a regression of stock returns on a constant and the three Fama-French Factors and the market return is 
the respective market return factor. The column Weight shows whether the aggregation of the stock-level 
coefficients is done on an equally-weighted basis (EW), or weighted by the average market-value of each stock 
over the sample period (VW).The coefficients are scaled by 100 and the adjusted R2 is in percentages. The 
asterisks *, **, and *** denote statistical significance on a 10%, 5%, and 1% level of a two-sided t-test. Results 
in Panels B and C refer to the estimation of the following regressions each day for every stock individually: 
, ,0 ,1 ,
,1
, ,1 ,1 ,
,
,0 ,,
, ,2 ,1 ,
,
MVolume ,
ˆ MVolume
,
ˆ ˆ
,
i d i i d i d
i d
i d i i i d
i d
i ii d
i d i i i d
i d
Volume
IA
Volume
IA
Volume
θ θ ω
θα ψ τ
θ ωα λ ν
= + +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟= + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
whereby the variable definitions are presented in Table 1. Panel B shows the medians of the stock-level median 
estimates of α1 and α2, which are labeled Security-specific Short-selling and Market-wide Short-selling, 
respectively. The columns Relative security-specific short-selling show the ratio of the absolute value of α1 to 
the sum of the absolute values of α1 and α2 and the column Intra-day interval indicates whether volume and IA 
during one-minute intra-day interval d are Trade size-weighted means or cumulative Sums. Numbers in the two 
left-most columns of Relative Volume and Turnover are in basis points and Dollar Volume is in dollars. Panel C 
shows the median information content of short-sales based on Dollar Volume of market-wide and security-
specific short-selling by Trade-type. Values associated with Relative Volume are in basis points. 
 
Panel A – Average Relationship of Short-volume with Market-level and Stock-specific 
Returns 
 
Trade-type Weight
All Trades EW 12.51 0.36 28.46 * 1.88 12.0
VW 44.90 1.10 88.50 *** 3.30 9.6
NYSE trades EW 11.71 0.18 26.67 ** 2.03 11.9
VW 40.61 1.08 79.50 *** 3.26 9.4
Off-NYSE EW 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.68 5.4
VW 0.47 0.61 0.73 * 1.66 4.1
Non-Exempt EW 11.99 0.35 25.22 * 1.80 11.6
VW 37.40 1.10 76.18 *** 3.35 9.7
Exempt EW -0.24 0.07 1.59 0.34 3.0
VW 3.68 0.12 4.06 0.42 1.6
Regular buys and sales EW -34.71 -0.22 -5.07 0.08 10.6
VW -188.47 -0.51 31.46 -0.04 5.0
Coefficient t -statistic t -statistic Adj. R2Coefficient
Market Returns Stock-specific Returns
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Table 4 – Market-wide and Security-specific Short-sales (continued) 
Panel B – Market-wide and Security-specific Short-selling by Return Horizon 
 
Intraday Interval Time Horizon Dollar Volume Relative Volume Turnover Dollar Volume Relative Volume Turnover Dollar Volume Relative Volume Turnover
Trade size-weighted mean 15 minutes -2.57 -2.01 -1.48 -5.42 -2.59 -2.38 0.68 0.56 0.62
60 minutes -1.50 -1.34 -1.06 -3.61 -1.74 -1.70 0.71 0.57 0.62
1 day 1.91 1.97 2.26 5.28 3.08 2.65 0.73 0.61 0.54
3 days 5.11 8.13 8.49 12.17 8.33 7.82 0.70 0.51 0.48
5 days 11.01 16.30 16.22 26.17 16.10 16.37 0.70 0.50 0.50
Sum 15 minutes -3.66 -3.67 -2.71 -6.31 -4.74 -4.55 0.63 0.56 0.63
60 minutes -2.35 -2.64 -1.98 -4.46 -3.52 -3.38 0.66 0.57 0.63
1 day 2.51 3.31 3.28 5.13 5.02 4.67 0.67 0.60 0.59
3 days 5.83 9.88 8.76 11.36 11.61 11.74 0.66 0.54 0.57
5 days 11.77 19.24 17.05 26.69 24.79 23.85 0.69 0.56 0.58
Market-wide Short-selling Security-specific Short-selling Relative Security-specific Short-selling
 
 
 
Panel C – Market-wide and Security-specific Short-selling by Trade-type 
 
Intraday Interval Time Horizon NYSE Trades Off-NYSE Exempt Non-exempt Non-pilot Pilot Stocks NYSE Trades Off-NYSE Exempt Non-exempt Non-pilot Pilot Stocks
Trade size-weighted mean 15 minutes -2.57 -2.03 0.45 -2.31 -2.00 -2.41 -4.10 -2.26 0.27 -4.35 -3.77 -4.95
60 minutes -1.50 -2.00 0.00 -1.50 -1.33 -1.45 -2.67 -2.25 0.00 -2.85 -2.83 -3.13
1 day 1.91 -2.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 1.69 -0.31 -2.27 -0.50 0.00 0.00 7.33
3 days 5.11 -1.08 -0.50 1.82 2.83 4.71 2.00 -2.20 -1.50 2.01 3.00 11.29
5 days 11.01 7.51 4.11 7.69 5.84 11.36 11.02 8.00 4.49 12.82 10.07 23.66
Sum 15 minutes -3.66 -2.50 0.53 -2.69 -2.41 -3.78 -4.76 -2.51 0.52 -5.02 -4.04 -6.08
60 minutes -2.35 -2.08 0.00 -1.85 -1.58 -2.40 -3.34 -2.51 0.00 -3.49 -3.00 -4.15
1 day 2.51 -1.50 0.08 0.00 0.05 3.22 -0.25 -2.13 -0.05 0.00 0.00 6.58
3 days 5.83 -2.00 -0.50 1.04 2.71 4.97 2.13 -2.51 -1.14 1.59 2.50 10.89
5 days 11.77 7.50 3.15 6.80 6.89 10.39 10.44 7.28 4.00 13.06 10.30 26.43
Market-wide Short-selling (Dollar Volume) Security-specific Short-selling (Dollar Volume)
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Table 5 – Informed Trading around Earnings Announcements 
This table shows in Panel A the results of regressing IA of short sales, regular buys and sales on a set of explanatory 
variables: 
( )
( ) ( )
, 0 1 , ,
, 0 1 , 2 , ,
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
IA ShortDummy
IA ShortDummy ShortDummy PilotDummy
IA ShortDummy ShortDummy PilotDummy NYSEVOL PilotDummy
β β ε
β β β ε
β β β β ε
= + +
= + + × +
= + + × + × +
 
whereby ShortDummy is a dummy being one if IAi,t refers to short sales and zero otherwise. PilotDummy is a dummy if 
stock i is a pilot stock and zero otherwise. NYSEVOL is the short volume traded on the NYSE standardized using the non-
parametric method of normal scores. In the table below, column Relative to Announcement shows whether the regression 
uses observations at the date of the earnings announcement (Contemporaneous) or observations 1 day prior to the 
announcement. All coefficients are in basis points and the p-value associated with the null hypothesis of the coefficient 
being equal to zero is reported in parentheses underneath. Panel B reports the Mean Volume Relative to the 
Announcement Day of Short-sales, regular buys and sales at the quarterly earnings announcement day and one day 
earlier, indicated by the column headers 0 and –1, respectively. The individual rows specify short volume by Return 
Quintile based on abnormal returns. The asterisks *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% 
associated with a two-sided t-test of the mean normalized market adjusted volume number in the particular Return 
Quintile being significantly different from zero. Stock-level volume is adjusted for average market trading activity and 
the normalization is done on a stock-level across all dates. 
Panel A – IA around Earnings Announcements  
Relative to 
Announcement IA Horizon Intercept
Short 
Dummy
Pilot X Short 
Dummy Adj R2
Contemporaneous 60 minutes 13.86 -18.26 5.6
(0.00) (0.00)
13.86 -19.96 2.38 5.6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.39)
13.86 -18.29 1.54 5.7
(0.00) (0.00) (0.30)
1 day 10.69 -36.69 0.3
(0.31) (0.01)
10.69 -44.55 11.03 0.3
(0.31) (0.05) (0.64)
10.69 -37.54 40.90 0.9
(0.31) (0.01) (0.00)
5 days 13.07 -17.01 0.0
(0.40) (0.44)
13.07 42.12 -82.99 0.4
(0.40) (0.20) (0.02)
13.07 -18.47 70.06 0.8
(0.40) (0.40) (0.00)
1 day prior 60 minutes 10.55 -16.15 8.0
(0.00) (0.00)
10.55 -22.75 9.15 9.0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
10.55 -16.15 -0.24 8.0
(0.00) (0.00) (0.86)
1 day 9.95 -26.03 0.2
(0.40) (0.12)
9.95 -17.28 -12.12 0.2
(0.40) (0.50) (0.65)
9.95 -25.81 10.69 0.2
(0.40) (0.13) (0.47)
5 days 6.84 -10.95 0.0
(0.74) (0.71)
6.84 94.32 -145.85 0.8
(0.74) (0.04) (0.00)
6.84 -9.27 84.93 0.9
(0.74) (0.75) (0.00)
NYSEVOL x 
Short Dummy
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Table 5 – Informed Trading around Earnings Announcements (continued) 
 
Panel B – Average Volume by Return Group 
 
0 -1 0 -1 0 -1
-5 0.01 0.00 0.42*** 0.05 0.37*** 0.1**
-4 0.13*** -0.07* 0.56*** 0.05 0.63*** 0.07*
-3 0.16*** 0.02 0.6*** 0.13*** 0.6*** 0.13***
-2 0.07* -0.02 0.64*** 0.08** 0.66*** 0.14***
-1 0.14*** -0.02 0.7*** 0.1** 0.68*** 0.13***
1 0.1** 0.00 0.62*** 0.11*** 0.57*** 0.13***
2 0.06 -0.05 0.58*** 0.05 0.66*** 0.06
3 0.02 -0.09** 0.52*** 0.00 0.49*** 0.04
4 -0.17*** -0.21*** 0.19*** -0.15*** 0.25*** -0.15***
5 0.08*** -0.03 0.49*** 0.05 0.51*** 0.08***
Quintile
Market-adjusted Mean Volume Relative to Announcement Day
Return Short-sales Regular Buys Regular Sales
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Table 6 – Short Sales and Liquidity Providers’ Inventory 
This table shows the relationship between liquidity providers’ inventory and trading activity by short-sellers via estimating the 
following regression Specifications: 
i,t i,0 1 i,t 1 i,t(1) ShortVolume Inventory ,−= β + β + ε  
5
i,t j j,i,t 1 i,tj 1
(2) ShortVolume InventoryDummy ,−== γ + ε∑  
5 6
i,t j j,i,t 1 k k,i,t i,tj 1 k 1
(3) ShortVolume InventoryDummy TradeTypeDummy ,−= == γ + δ + ε∑ ∑  
( )5i,t j j,i,t 1 i,t 5,i,t 1 i,tj 1(4) ShortVolume InventoryDummy FutureReturn InventoryDummy ,− −== γ + ϑ × + ε∑    
whereby ShortVolume refers to the volume of short-sales scaled by the average Dollar trading volume of stock i during the year 
normalized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The variable definitions are given in Table 1. The table below 
reports the estimated regression coefficients and in parentheses to the right of each coefficient the p-value associated with a two-
sided t-test of the coefficient being equal to zero. As Specification (4) excludes the data set that contains data calculated across All 
trades, the base-level trade-type is the sample comprising trades in Non-pilot stocks. The R2 calculated following the derivation by 
Nagelkerke (1991) is in percentages. 
 
Specifi-
cation Variable Coeff p -value Coeff p -value Coeff p -value Coeff p -value Coeff p -value Coeff p -value Coeff p -value
(1) Inventory -0.130 (0.00) -0.132 (0.00) -0.048 (0.00) -0.148 (0.00) -0.013 (0.00) -0.177 0.000 -0.083 (0.00)
R2 4.69 4.99 7.84 5.47 0.02 8.07 0.79
(2) Inventory Group 1 0.283 (0.00) 0.285 (0.00) 0.098 (0.00) 0.313 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00) 0.360 (0.00) 0.206 (0.00)
Inventory Group 2 -0.006 (0.07) -0.006 (0.07) 0.008 (0.07) -0.002 (0.62) -0.003 (0.57) -0.001 (0.86) -0.014 (0.02)
Inventory Group 3 -0.105 (0.00) -0.105 (0.00) -0.037 (0.00) -0.113 (0.00) -0.007 (0.16) -0.125 (0.00) -0.086 (0.00)
Inventory Group 4 -0.141 (0.00) -0.142 (0.00) -0.044 (0.00) -0.156 (0.00) -0.012 (0.01) -0.171 (0.00) -0.112 (0.00)
Inventory Group 5 -0.035 (0.00) -0.035 (0.00) -0.028 (0.00) -0.046 (0.00) -0.004 (0.45) -0.069 (0.00) 0.003 (0.60)
R2 2.25 2.28 0.26 2.75 0.004 3.60 1.23
(3) Inventory Group 1 0.008 (0.02) 0.006 (0.07) -0.097 (0.00) 0.005 (0.17) 0.284 (0.00) 0.009 (0.01)
Inventory Group 2 -0.028 (0.00)
Inventory Group 3 -0.038 (0.00)
Inventory Group 4 -0.042 (0.00)
Inventory Group 5 -0.034 (0.00)
R2 1.00
(4) Inventory Group 1 0.283 (0.00) 0.284 (0.00) 0.098 (0.00) 0.311 (0.00) 0.025 (0.00) 0.360 (0.00) 0.204 (0.00)
Inventory Group 2 -0.006 (0.07) -0.006 (0.07) 0.008 (0.07) -0.002 (0.62) -0.003 (0.57) -0.001 (0.86) -0.014 (0.02)
Inventory Group 3 -0.105 (0.00) -0.105 (0.00) -0.037 (0.00) -0.113 (0.00) -0.007 (0.16) -0.125 (0.00) -0.086 (0.00)
Inventory Group 4 -0.141 (0.00) -0.142 (0.00) -0.044 (0.00) -0.156 (0.00) -0.012 (0.01) -0.171 (0.00) -0.112 (0.00)
Inventory Group 5 -0.035 (0.00) -0.034 (0.00) -0.027 (0.00) -0.045 (0.00) -0.003 (0.61) -0.066 (0.00) 0.001 (0.82)
Future Return -0.566 (0.00) -0.582 (0.00) -0.313 (0.00) -0.641 (0.00) -0.160 (0.00) -0.678 (0.00) -0.478 (0.00)
R2 2.61 2.64 0.30 3.20 0.02 3.68 1.84
Exempt Pilot stocks Non-pilot
Short-sale Trade-type
All trades NYSE trades Off-NYSE Non-exempt
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Table 7 – Variance Ratio Test for Pilot and Non-pilot Stocks 
This table shows the results of conducting a variance-ratio test following  on the daily CRSP-returns data on the 
pilot and non-pilot stocks in our sample. For that purpose, a value-weighted return index for the pilot and non-
pilot stocks is calculated, which forms the basis of the test. A ratio of unity indicated no auto-correlation, a ratio 
below (above) one indicates negative (positive) autocorrelation. The heteroskedasticity consistent test-statistic 
has been calculated using various Frequencies. The column of the normally distributed Test-statistic shows the 
significance of the deviation of the variance ratio from unity. 
 
 
Frequencies Variance Ratio Test Statistic Variance Ratio Test Statistic
2 0.91 -0.89 1.04 0.35
4 0.81 -1.28 1.01 0.05
8 0.73 -1.22 0.90 -0.45
16 0.67 -1.07 0.92 -0.25
Pilot Stocks Non-pilot Stocks
 
